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Self-Determination and Moral Variation*
Bas van der Vossen
Self-determination plays a central role in debates about international morality and
law. One important argument invokes the value of self-determination in order to
show that rules of international morality and law should be modest or limited in
content. The basic idea is clear enough. Self-determination seems to involve a kind
of social process by which different groups, including political states, can develop
their own distinctive shared moral codes. And so there can be legitimate moral
variation between political societies. Because self-determination is valuable, the
argument goes, acceptable international norms should allow for this variation, at
least within certain limits. Self-determination thus constrains the demands of global
justice and, consequently, international law.1

* Thanks to Fernando Tesón, David Lefkowitz, and David Shoemaker for very helpful constructive
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1 David Miller asks rhetorically: “If political communities are in general to be self-governing in
matters of economic and social policy and so forth, what scope is left for cosmopolitan principles of
justice that seek to treat people equally regardless of which community they belong to?” See David
Miller, “Defending Political Autonomy: a Discussion of Charles Beitz”, Review of International Studies
31 (2005): 381-88, p. 388. Miller has developed this thought in detail in various places. See e.g. David
Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 4, and David Miller, National Responsibility
and Global Justice, (Oxford University Press, 2007). For related arguments, see Michael Walzer, “The
Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 (1980): 209–229,
or Chris Armstrong, “National Self-Determination, Global Equality and Moral Arbitrariness”, Journal
of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 313–34.
An often overlooked, example of this view, I believe, is John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: with
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, (Harvard University Press, 2001). There are two striking points
to Rawls’ view. First, in contrast to his earlier argument that states are legitimate only if they are
liberal (see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 137), The Law of
Peoples ascribes this status to both liberal and non-liberal but “decent” societies. That is, both liberal
and merely decent societies are full members of international society, have rights of political
independence (pp. 37ff), and their citizens are obligated to obey the law (pp. 65-6). Second, Rawls
denied that his preferred principles of distributive justice applied internationally. The kinds of
inequality Rawls thought unbearable between citizens of liberal society, he accepted between
different societies.
Both points are part of Rawls’ attempt to recognize the value of self-determination. First,
while decent societies are not liberal, Rawls insists that their political institutions contain a system of
“consultation.” This is supposed to ensure that people’s voices and interests will be among the main
inputs of political decision-making. The view that arises is that the good of self-determination is part
universal, part local. What is universal is that a society must be organized around “its common good
idea of justice” (pp. 65-8). But this requirement can be fulfilled in different local ways, including but
not limited to the liberal way. This, Rawls suggests, preserves “significant room for the idea of a
people's self-determination” (p. 61, see also p. 111). Moreover, second, Rawls announces that the
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We can state this argument in the following (enthymematic) form:
(1) States can have a right to self-determination
(2) Self-determination allows for moral variation between different communities
(3) Therefore, to respect state self-determination, international moral norms
should be limited
The relevance of this argument goes beyond the point that international principles
of justice should be more modest than domestic ones. The claim that states have a
right to self-determination is among the most commonly accepted principles of
international ethical and legal thought. And state self-determination is often thought
to be important precisely because it allows for moral variation between societies.2
Self-determining states are thought to enjoy a kind of moral status – one that calls
for respect, non-interference, independence, democracy, and even a right to curb
immigration.3
Yet despite its prominence and potential implications, it is difficult to find
any precise accounts of what exactly is involved in self-determination, why it
matters, or how it might lead to legitimate moral variation. That is, while many seem
confident in their assertions about what is required to respect self-determination,
few seem confident to assert what self-determination really is. This poses a problem
because many of the former assertions are disputed, and some, including the
argument above, are highly controversial. But without a real grip on what self-

good of self-determination is his reason for endorsing limited redistributive principles
internationally (p. 85).
2 Many argue, for example, that self-determination matters because it allows for distinct national
cultures that provide a background for people to develop meaningful characters and make
meaningful decisions about how to live. See David Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford University Press,
1997), Armstrong, “National Self-Determination, Global Equality and Moral Arbitrariness”, Will
Kymlicka, “Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective,” in David Miller and Sohail
Hashmi (eds.), Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, (Princeton University Press,
2001), pp. 249-75, Margaret Moore, “Cosmopolitanism and Political Communities,” Social Theory and
Practice 32 (2006): 627-58
3 For examples of such arguments, see Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”, Ethics 105
(1995): 352–385, Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-determination and Secession, (Oxford
University Press, 2003), Michael Walzer, Just And Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical
Illustrations. 4th ed., (Basic Books, 2006), Michael Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States”,
Christopher H. Wellman, A Theory of Secession, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), Andrew Altman
and Christopher H. Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice. Reprint., (Oxford University
Press, 2011).
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determination is, we lack the means to settle questions about what we have to do to
respect it.
The purpose of this essay is to move away from this state of affairs. It offers
an account of why self-determination can lead to genuine moral variation, and it
asks whether political states can indeed be self-determining in this sense.
1. Desiderata for a Theory of Self-Determination
Formulating an account of the nature of self-determination is no easy task. Some of
its contours are clear enough: the idea of self-determination is closely related to the
idea of autonomy, and self-determining communities are often described as selfgoverning. Beyond that, it is notoriously difficult to explicate the idea in any clear
and convincing way.
A satisfying theory of self-determination should occupy the space between
two commitments that are seemingly in tension. The first of these is that selfdetermination can happen only when people live and act, in some robust sense,
together. Its locus is the group or community, not just the individual or even the sum
of individuals that make up the group. As Christopher Wellman puts it, selfdetermination is “something that can be exercised by a collective as a whole rather
than individually by persons in a group.”4 Self-determination is an importantly
collective value.5
The second commitment expresses moral individualism. This demands that
an account of self-determination avoid excessive romanticism, or even mysticism,
about the state or political society. Such romanticism occurs when one views society
or the state as a moral entity in and of itself, with a kind of moral status that is
independent of, and maybe even more important than, the true ultimate locus of
moral value: the individual. To satisfy the demands of moral individualism, one’s

See Wellman, A Theory of Secession, p. 41 (emphasis in original)
See Altman and Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice. See also Walzer, “The Moral
Standing of States”, and Walzer, Just And Unjust Wars.
4
5
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account of self-determination and its value must ultimately be based on
observations about individuals and their value.6
The difficulty of developing a satisfying theory of self-determination thus lies
in explaining how truly collective social processes can lead to legitimate moral
variation between societies, in a way that does not posit groups or states as
independent entities of moral value. More precisely, we can formulate the following
three (again, seemingly conflicting) desiderata for a theory of self-determination.
Such an account must explain how:
(a) Self-determining groups can develop different moral codes
(b) These codes can be different from, and not simply reducible to, the moral
beliefs of their individual members
(c) Groups, societies, and states are not fundamentally morally valuable, but
derive whatever value they have from their individual members
Many available approaches to self-determination fail to adequately
incorporate all of these desiderata. A purely institutionalist theory, for example,
might suggest that the value of self-determination lies in people living under
political institutions they have created themselves.7 But this leaves unexplained why
self-determination might bring about legitimate moral variation between societies.
After all, it seems perfectly consistent with such a view to maintain that each of
those states should implement exactly the same norms. International and domestic
norms might thus be the same. The idea of self-determination thus cannot be fully
understood by merely focusing on the creation of independent political institutions.
A purely individualist theory, by contrast, might see group self-determination
as simply the sum of individuals choosing to live together.8 On such a view, the
outcomes of self-determination would be a collection of individual choices. But how
can that explanation capture self-determination’s collective nature? Selfdetermination, we said, is something that essentially occurs at the level of the group,
See the careful discussion in Wellman, A Theory of Secession, ch. 3.
For a possible example of such a view, see Wellman, A Theory of Secession. Wellman suggests (p. 57)
that violations of self-determination are wrongful because they disrespect the collective achievement
of people to create their own state.
8 See e.g. Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination”
6
7
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not just among several separate individuals. The collective nature of selfdetermination disappears from sight if we simply reduce it to individual choice.9
In what follows, I offer a theory of self-determination that aims to
incorporate each of these three commitments. Drawing on recent findings by
Christian List and Philip Pettit about group agency and judgment aggregation,10 I
will describe how groups can come to have moral codes that are at the same time
based on, yet separate from, the moral views of their individual members. I will then
explain why the development of such group moral codes can be valuable. Finally, I
will ask whether these processes can take place within political states. Here, my
conclusions will be skeptical. While self-determination can lead to genuine moral
variation, the requisite processes do not take place within states.
2. The Possibility of Collective Self-determination
A moral code is a set of propositions about morality that is endorsed by its holder.11
A group moral code, if such a thing is possible, thus consists of the set of beliefs
about morality that is shared by a group. The theory of self-determination I will
develop holds that when different individuals together form a group, their several
beliefs about morality (their several moral codes) can combine into a new and
separate moral code. This new moral code will be held by the group as such, and will
not be readily reducible to the beliefs of its members. As a result, this theory can
Hegel’s theory of the state might be an example of a view that fails commitment (c). Hegel wrote:
“The state is the actuality of the ethical idea. It is ethical mind qua the substantial will manifest and
revealed to itself, knowing and thinking itself” And: “The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is
the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness once that
consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality. This substantial unity is an
absolute unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its supreme right. On the other hand
this final end has supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the
state.” See G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right: the Philosophy of History, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford
University Press, 1967), pp. 155-6. See also the discussion in Fernando Tesón, Humanitarian
Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 3rd ed., (Transnational, 2005), pp.62ff.
10 The argument below relies on the argument presented in Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group
Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents, (Oxford University Press, 2011). In a
way, what follows can be seen as the extension of List and Pettit’s findings about group agency to the
realm of group self-determination. The title of the next section pays homage to the title of the first
part of their book.
11 No doubt this is to simplify considerably. The intuitive notion of a moral code may well include
more than merely propositions, such as attitudes, affects, and so on. I set these complications aside
for the sake of argument.
9
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explain how self-determination can lead to genuine moral variation between
groups. After all, different groups, being constituted by different members, can
produce different moral codes. However, because the group’s code is ultimately
based on, or the product of, the moral codes of its individual members, this theory
still satisfies the demands of moral individualism.
To see how this is possible, we need to consider on what grounds we might
ascribe beliefs about moral propositions to groups. To stay true to the individualism
we have endorsed, such group beliefs must be ultimately explainable in terms of the
beliefs of individual members. There are numerous ways of doing this, but let us
here focus on the most obvious one: a simple majoritarian rule. A group, we might
then say, has a certain belief if the majority of its members has that belief.
Of course this way of understanding group beliefs seems to ignore claim (b)
above. That is, it seems to understand group beliefs as straightforwardly reducible
to those of its members. But this appearance is deceiving. For, under certain
conditions, there simply is no way of understanding group beliefs as aggregated
individual beliefs. More precisely, it is not possible to arrive at a consistent set of
group beliefs in this way. Even more precisely, if moral beliefs have basic logical
connections, and a group’s moral code is going to satisfy minimal requirements of
consistency between those beliefs, then it can be necessary for the group to endorse
certain propositions that are not held by the majority of its members.
It will be easier to see this by looking at an example.12 Consider a group’s
beliefs about distributive justice. Let us assume that there is no single morally
correct system of distributive justice but that, within certain limits, a variety of
different regimes are acceptable. Among these figure regimes which enforce
strongly egalitarian distributions as well as regimes that allow markets to be the
primary determinant of holdings. Let us further suppose that the individual
members of the group base their views about distributive justice on their views
concerning two other issues – to put it slightly differently, they treat their views
The example here is a variation on a problem that can arise in legal contexts, first presented in
Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, “Unpacking the court”, Yale Law Journal 96 (1986): 82–
117. List and Pettit discuss similar cases, which they call “discursive dilemmas.”
12
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about distributive justice as conclusions based on these premises. These are: (i) that
the point of a society’s economic system is to enhance economic productivity, and
(ii) that tampering with people’s property rights through redistributive policies will
significantly reduce productivity.13
Finally, suppose that there are certain basic logical connections between the
conclusion about distributive justice and these two issues such that a consistent
person must favor the market as the primary determinant of people’s holdings if she
assents to both (i) and (ii). Table 1 lists the views on these issues of a three-person
group. The views of each individual, as well as the views of the group based on the
views of the majority, are listed below.
Table 1: Group beliefs on distributive justice
Property to enhance
productivity

Redistribution reduces
productivity

Market outcomes should
determine holdings

P1

Yes

No

No

P2

No

Yes

No

P3

Yes

Yes

Yes

----

----

----

----

G

Yes

Yes

No

Note that each of the individuals has internally consistent beliefs about
distributive justice. None of the persons endorses both premises of the argument
without also endorsing the conclusion. However, the aggregate views of the group
are inconsistent in just this way. For while the majority of the group believes both
that the point of property systems is to enhance economic productivity and that

Two points of clarification. First, as should be obvious, nothing for the present argument turns on
this particular example. The assumptions in the text are only chosen for ease of exposition. If you
strongly disagree with these points, you are free to insert your own favored issue. Second, and
equally obvious, the example given here significantly understates the complexity involved. The
propositions (i) and (ii) are really not simply, but complex propositions, each of the constituent parts
of which people might take diverging views. This complexity bolsters the result below as well as its
implications. That is, the more complex the issues involved, the stronger the case for the possibility of
self-determination. See also List and Pettit, Group Agency, p. 77
13
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redistributive policies interfere with this, the majority of the group also believes
that a strongly egalitarian distribution ought to be enforced. Thus, ex hypothesi, the
group’s moral views are internally inconsistent even though none of its members’
are.
The result here, of course, is not a product of the particular issue concerning
distributive justice. It can occur with any set of beliefs that have modest logical
connections. Less obviously, the result is also not a feature of the majoritarian
method of aggregating individual beliefs. As List and Pettit have shown, given a
number of plausible conditions, this problem can arise for any method of
aggregation (participatory, hierarchical, majoritarian, super-majoritarian) – with
the only exceptions being unattractive methods such as dictatorships.14
For obvious reasons, a group’s moral code should be internally consistent. If
the group is at the same time committed to premises that imply a conclusion, and
the denial of that conclusion, it will not be able to come to any determinate views.
Proponents of the conclusion will be able, and quite reasonably so, to point to the
group’s views about the premises. Opponents of the conclusion will be able, and
quite reasonably so, to point to the group’s view about the conclusion. Thus, without
an internally consistent group moral code, the group will lack the ability to arrive at
determinate answers for certain cases – like the case of distributive justice.15
This raises some difficult questions. Groups face a choice between basing
their views on the majority’s views concerning the premises or the majority’s views
concerning the conclusion of a certain issue. It is a substantive moral issue which of
the two will be the correct way to go, and this question lies beyond the focus of this
essay. But the very fact that there is such a choice to be made shows something
important for our purposes. For, whichever way we go, it will be true that certain
See Christian List, Philip Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result”,
Economics and Philosophy 18 (2002): 89-110. The result here is an extension of Arrow’s famous
impossibility-theorem.
15 List and Pettit claim that this kind of consistency is a condition of group agency. Some people have
challenged this thought. See e.g. Robert Sugden, “Must Group Agents Be Rational? List and Pettit’s
Theory of Judgement Aggregation and Group Agency”, Economics and Philosophy 28 (2012): 265-73,
p. 269. But even if Sugden’s challenge succeeds against the theory of group agency, the account of
group self-determination I am offering here survives. For my account relies on the very plausible
assumption that morality should be consistent.
14
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propositions need to be recognized as genuine elements of a group’s moral code
even though they are not directly reducible to the views of its members. Either the
group adopts the majority’s views on the conclusion – but then it will commit itself
to beliefs about the premises that are contrary to the majority’s views. Or it adopts
the majority’s views on the premises – at the price of ignoring the majority’s views
on the conclusion. In either case, the group will have adopted a view that is
(directly) contrary to its views on one issue, even though it is (indirectly) based on
its members’ views about another issue. That is, in either case, the group will have a
view that is genuinely formed at the group-level.
Note just how far-reaching this result is. For one, the beliefs of a group’s
members turn out to be both unnecessary and insufficient for particular group
beliefs. In this way, the group can achieve views that are, in a sense, autonomous or
self-standing. Groups as a whole might endorse something even though each of its
members does not endorse it. In fact, the group might endorse something that each
of its members opposes.16
Let us call group norms that arise in this way emergent group norms.17 The
processes by which emergent group norms arise, I propose, are processes of group
self-determination. Self-determination, then, can indeed lead to genuine moral
variation between groups.
This account helps explain both the “self” and the “determination” of selfdetermination. It is “determination” because groups, as such, can produce their own
moral codes. And it is determination by the “self” because these processes occur on
the basis of members’ moral codes. This account therefore satisfies all three claims
(a)-(c) identified in the previous section. It demonstrates (a) how genuine moral
variation between self-determining groups is possible, (b) why this variation is not
simply variation between the views of groups’ individual members, yet (c) it does so
This, in turn, seems to violate certain other intuitive ideas about how rational groups should
behave, such as that they allow Pareto-superior moves. See Robert Sugden, “Team Preferences”,
Economics and Philosophy 16 (2000): 175-204, p. 188. For a different kind of argument, see Margaret
Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 137.
17 In technical terms, the group’s beliefs supervene on the beliefs of its members. Roughly, A
supervenes on B if, and only if, necessarily, the facts about A cannot change without some
accompanying change in the facts about B. For discussion, see List and Pettit, p. 65.
16
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by invoking only facts about its individual members (and no mysterious or magical
group-entities or values).
3. The Value of Group Self-Determination
With this basic description of how self-determination works in place, we can now
turn to the question of its value. What, if anything, is the importance of these
processes such that their results command the kind of respect that selfdetermination is usually thought to command?
The answer to this question is not obvious. It will not do, for example, to
simply state that it matters for people to live on shared or mutually agreed terms,
and that those terms require group membership. One might think this, say, if one
thought of self-determination as a simple extension of the autonomous choices of
individual members, or based on something like Rousseau’s idea of a General Will.
Such approaches typically regard a group’s moral code as something that its
individual members are rationally committed to endorse – either because they
actively endorsed it (through voting, say) or because the group outcome represents
their views in a relevant way.
But while it may well be true that there is value in living on mutually agreed
terms, this cannot explain the value (if any) of group self-determination. For group
self-determination can actually be in tension with living on mutually agreed terms.
After all, as we have seen, self-determining groups can produce emergent moral
codes that contain elements that its members individually reject. In such a case,
living on the terms that are the outcome of self-determination means living on terms
that one rejects.
The real question, then, is how group self-determination might have value for
the reason that it enables emergent group norms that are relatively independent of
individual beliefs and norms, not in spite of it. One such source of value is that group
self-determination offers a particularly attractive way for individuals who would
otherwise have intractable moral disagreement to interact and cooperate. Consider
different people who disagree on a certain issue, like the correct interpretation of
distributive justice. There are a number of ways in which they might interact with
10

one another. One way would be to deliberate and discuss the issue. Often, people
come to certain conclusions on the basis of faulty reasoning, and deliberation might
help people to identify their mistakes, thereby removing the source of the
disagreement. Another way is to sideline the issue. Sometimes we can
“compartmentalize” issues and allow different people to act on their different views
of how things ought to be. Freedom of religion might be a case in point, which
enables theists and atheists to live together without having to settle upon a shared
view about the existence of God or the importance of religion.
But these options cannot resolve all cases of disagreement. For one, as the
example of group inconsistencies in Table 1 above showed, even those who reason
in internally consistent ways can nevertheless end up with collectively inconsistent
beliefs. And not all moral issues can be compartmentalized in the way that religious
freedom achieves. Sometimes people need to coordinate on a single outcome, and
perhaps distributive justice is one such case.
In these cases of disagreement, norms that emerge as a result of group selfdetermination can help solve the problem. That is, members of the same group,
whose individual moral outlooks are incompatible on issues where compatibility is
required, can use the group’s emergent norm as a salient point of convergence for
their actions. Consider again the case illustrated in Table 1 above. The three persons
involved there deeply disagree about not only the requirements of distributive
justice itself, but also about the merits of the premises that support their respective
views about this. The process of group self-determination offers them a way of
overcoming their disagreement: they can use the group’s emergent view as a point
on which they can converge.18
This feature of self-determination is attractive for a number of reasons. First,
the process is reliable. Because none of the views of individual members are
necessary or sufficient for the group’s norms, it turns out that even people with very
complex and intricately different individual moral views can combine to bring about

Recall: this emergent view can be either the conclusion of the argument or one of the premises. The
point here is neutral between the two.
18
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a relatively simple and clear moral code at the group level.19 Second, and more
obviously, it allows people to resolve what might otherwise become a conflict by
non-coercive means. Members of groups who take emergent norms as devices for
coordinating their actions can thus live together peacefully.
Emergent norms are particularly well suited for this purpose because they
are not, as we have seen, readily reducible to any of the personal views of the
disagreeing parties. This allows them to have a kind of impartial character –
something different than one of the parties insisting that his or her view is correct
after all. Yet, because they are indirectly (and, given certain methods of aggregation,
potentially symmetrically) based on the views of the parties involved, they are not
simply imposed on them either. These group codes are still importantly connected
to the views of their members. In fact, group norms and individual views are not
static. Group norms and individual views can interact. When a group adopts a
certain position, this can lead individual members to reconsider their own views on
the matter. Thus, processes of self-determination will likely involve repeated
adjustments of individual views to group norms, and vice versa. This tightens the
connection between emergent group moral norms and the views of its members.20
It can make sense, then, for people to value the processes by which emergent
norms come about. And it can make sense to insist that others respect these norms.
The reason is the same: the process of group self-determination provides people
who would otherwise face real problems of disagreement with the possibility of
living together on terms that are logically and morally consistent as well as selfimposed in the sense that they are the result of their own views.
Before moving on, two points are worth stressing. First, the fact that selfdetermination can be valuable does not undo the need for independent moral
standards that determine what emergent norms are acceptable. It may be tempting
here to suggest that we should evaluate the acceptability of a group’s emergent
norms in terms of the underlying norms of its members. But this will not do. For
Cf. List and Pettit, Group Agency, p. 77
Note that this bolsters the idea of self-determination itself. For when there is this kind of back-andforth relation between group and individual beliefs, it becomes even more difficult to reduce the
group’s moral code to its members’ respective views.
19
20
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even though the group’s norms are the product of its members’ views, the two are
importantly separate. It is in principle possible for a group to develop a problematic
collective code even if all its members’ views are acceptable, as well as for people
who each have deeply unjust views to develop a morally acceptable code as a group.
If we are to continue to distinguish between morally acceptable and unacceptable
group norms, then, we need to appeal to something other than the views of group
members. We need independent moral norms to make this judgment.
Second, the coordination made possible by group self-determination is
different from other ways in which disagreeing people can manage to cooperate.
Self-determination cannot be equated, for example, to coordination by rational but
disagreeing persons on the basis of conventions. Such conventions can allow people
to cooperate when they prefer to act on the same terms – even if this means they
cannot act on their individually preferred option. In such scenarios, if a convention
exists that identifies an option as the one on which to coordinate, it can become the
best option for each to act in that way.
An example of this is the kind of convention that often arises in subway
tunnels. If everyone in the tunnel is walking on the right hand side, and assuming
they do not want to bump into people all the time, this gives all people entering the
tunnel a reason to walk on the right hand side as well. By walking on the right side,
they all can get to where they are going, and that is ultimately what they care about
the most. This is true even if only some of them like this way of doing things, while
others think it would be better if everyone were walking on the left. Thus, the
convention can help people with varying preferences coordinate their actions.
Such conventional coordination is a common and important social
phenomenon. Yet there are fundamental ways in which it differs from cooperation
on the basis of emergent group norms. For example, conventional cooperation is
successful because each of the parties involved sees coordinating action as in their
self-interest. Such cooperation thus cannot survive the absence of a shared
preference for coordination. When people disagree about whether it is preferable to
act in a coordinated way, conventional cooperation breaks down. The same is not

13

true for emergent group norms. These can survive even disagreement about
whether to coordinate in a given case.21
Another difference is the ways in which conventional norms and emergent
group norms come about. Conventions can arise between persons who are perfect
strangers, and not members of a group in any meaningful way, such as people
entering a subway tunnel. All that is needed is that they share a preference for
coordinating their actions in certain ways. By contrast, emergent group norms can
only arise in what I have called self-determining groups. They require a kind of
aggregation procedure and can only provide reasons for compliance to their
members.
4. Self-Determination in Political States
Recall the argument with which we started:
(1) States can have a right to self-determination
(2) Self-determination allows for moral variation between different communities
(3) Therefore, to respect state self-determination, international moral norms
should be limited
The account of self-determination above vindicates the second premise of this
argument: self-determination can give rise to moral variation through emergent
group norms. What about the first premise? Can these processes take place within
political states? The answer to this question depends on whether the conditions of
membership in self-determining groups allow for states to be among them. This
section argues that, contrary to what is commonly thought, states cannot satisfy
those conditions.
The question of the membership conditions in self-determining groups
matters not just because it allows us to see whether states can be truly selfdetermining groups. It also matters because such membership might mean that one
be bound to follow the group’s emergent norms. Some philosophers think, for
Obviously, the absence of agreement to cooperate will cause significant practical problems even in
cases of self-determination. The point here, however, is different: emergent group norms can exist
independently of agreement or preference to coordinate, while conventions cannot. This suffices to
demonstrate the difference between the two.
21
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example, that it is a general feature of group membership that one becomes
obligated to follow the group’s collective rules or plans.22 This raises the stakes of
our discussion considerably. For while we have so far been focusing on the
opportunities that group self-determination brings, the possibility of emergent
group norms being binding provides some potential threats as well. If mere
membership in a group can make one bound by the emergent group norms, then
self-determination can also significantly limit the liberty one would otherwise enjoy.
Another reason this question matters is that changes in a group’s
membership can affect its emergent moral code. Since the composition of members’
views determines the group’s views, currently present members will have a stake in
who else becomes a member of their group. Given a certain membership profile, the
group’s moral code might resemble more closely a code that fits with one’s interests,
beliefs, or preferences. This raises a number of questions. Groups can be created,
and their membership can be influenced and molded in several ways. Some of these
are more agreeable than others, and so the possibility of self-determination may
incentivize bad behavior. Similarly, one might raise questions about the morality of
immigration. If states are self-determining groups, does this mean they get to
control who joins them through restricting immigration?23
For these reasons as well as others, it cannot be true that just any set or
collection of persons will qualify as a self-determining group. And of course that is
clearly right. For example, there is in some sense a group that contains all people
living within a mile of the Mason-Dixon Line. But it is highly implausible that this
group is capable of self-determination or generating obligations. The reason is clear:
the condition of membership in this group refers to the morally arbitrary or
meaningless fact of mere geographical location. And groups with membership

See e.g. Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation
Some theorists think that this fact about self-determination can justify coercive immigration
restrictions for states. For the argument that such views fail even if, contrary to the point here, states
can be genuinely self-determining, see Bas van der Vossen, “Immigration and Self-Determination”,
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, (forthcoming), doi: 10.1177/1470594X14533167.
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conditions that refer to only morally arbitrary or meaningless facts cannot have the
kind of moral characteristics I have attributed to self-determination.24
It is easy to identify certain sufficient conditions for membership in morally
relevant groups. Most plausibly, genuine consent can suffice. Consider, for example,
a group like a union, the members of which each agree to join the group. As such,
they can all become bound by the union’s decisions regarding controversial matters,
such as the acceptable terms of labor contracts, including decisions that do not
reflect their own evaluation of the matter at hand. In general, genuine consent can
change one’s moral status. And it can clearly generate the kind of membership that
can come with obligation.
There are also plausible examples of groups (including those that might be
characterized by obligations) that do not require consent. Consider for example a
group of neighbors whose houses are all painted a certain color. Suppose the
neighbors chose to live in the neighborhood because they like color-coordinated
houses. And suppose it is commonly known among them that the houses are
supposed to remain that color. Under those conditions, it may be that the neighbors
form a kind of group, and perhaps even that they are, as members of the group,
obligated not to change the color of their homes.
One of the more permissive accounts of group membership, in the sense of
accepting weak conditions for membership, is Margaret Gilbert’s “plural subject”
theory. According to Gilbert, groups (and group obligations) are the result of people
undertaking “joint commitments” to act together as a group. Such joint
commitments are the result of certain kinds of behavior on the part of the people
who will become the members of the group. These kinds of behavior express their
mutual readiness to become jointly committed in ways that are common knowledge
among the would-be members. This is the source of the group’s existence and its
accompanying obligations because it involves a commitment of the will on the part
of its members.25
For a similar point, see A. John Simmons, “External Justifications and Institutional Roles”, Journal of
Philosophy 93 (1996): 28-36.
25 See Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, pp. 128, 135, 138, 144, 166, and 271
24
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Let us call theories that require this kind of involvement of the will for group
membership in self-determining (or obligating) groups soft-voluntarist theories. We
can call them voluntarist because they insist that the morally relevant properties in
virtue of which people are members of groups make essential reference to their
wills. But we can call them soft-voluntarist because they will recognize as sufficient
undertakings of the will that fall short of consent or other clear outward signs of
acceptance usually associated with voluntary undertakings. (Insisting on these
would be a sign of hard-voluntarism.) Soft-voluntarism is plausible as a necessary
condition for membership in at least certain groups. It rules out cases like the
people living close to the Mason-Dixon Line. But it rules in cases like the colorcoordinating neighbors.
We cannot here settle the debate over whether soft-voluntarist conditions,
like Gilbert’s idea of joint commitment,26 can also be sufficient for membership in
groups and for the accompanying obligations. The important question for our
purposes, instead, is whether those views, if true, would support the first premise of
the argument above. If people can become jointly committed by being members of a
neighborhood, do they also become jointly committed by being members, citizens,
or subjects of the state? That is, when people live together as citizens in a state,
might they thereby become members of self-determining groups in the way
required for them to become obligated to comply with the state’s emergent
norms?27
There are two reasons why this thought ought to be resisted. The first has to
do with the normative significance of baseline, or normal, behavior. One cannot
become jointly committed merely by remaining where one is, going about one’s
ordinary life. Undertaking new obligations requires some sort of personal
engagement, uptake, or indication. This is an implication of the voluntarism that
For other examples, see Raimo Tuomela, The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social
Notions, (Stanford University Press, 1995). Tuomela writes: “A central thesis to be defended is that
the performance of a joint action, X . . . requires that the participants have explicitly or implicitly
agreed to perform action X” (p. 73). Or see Robert Sugden, “Team Preferences”, pp. 184, and 192ff.
who defends “taking oneself to be a member” as a condition for membership.
27 Gilbert might think so, as she argues that membership in a state can generate obligations. See
Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, parts II and III.
26
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soft-voluntarist theories accept. Thus, even if others take their going about their
normal daily lives to indicate their readiness to become obligated, and even if this is
publicly known, that fact alone cannot suffice to render one’s normal daily life
obligating.
To see this, consider the following example. Suppose Donna lives in a
neighborhood populated by extremely virtuous people. At some point, Donna’s
neighbors start a campaign for organ donation. They post signs saying things like
“This neighborhood donates kidneys!” and “We all donate!” The significance of these
signs is common knowledge among the neighbors and they take themselves to be
obligated to donate their kidneys. But suppose that Donna does not want to donate a
kidney, and also does not want to leave the neighborhood. If Donna chooses to
remain where she lives, she plainly does not thereby still become obligated to
donate her kidney. Her merely staying where she was, living her normal life, cannot
suffice for this.
If this is right, then mere citizenship in a state is not sufficient to become a
member in the sense required here. After all, most people become citizens of their
states in much the same way as Donna became part of the organ-donating
neighborhood. They are citizens by birth, ascription, or the decisions of their
parents. For most, citizenship requires no personal engagement, uptake, or
indication whatsoever. Indeed, actions that might normally constitute the relevant
signals (getting government issued identification, for example) are in many
countries necessary simply in order to live a normal life. But if such actions are not
sufficient to render Donna obligated to follow her group’s norms about organ
donation, then it seems similarly true that they are not sufficient to render citizens
obligated to follow their state’s emergent group norms. They are simply part of the
ordinary baseline of behavior.
The second reason for doubting that states are actually self-determining
units is slightly different: the appropriate conditions for taking people to be
obligated are sensitive to the comprehensiveness and impactfulness of the
obligations in question. This is due to the uncertainties and possible confusions that
typically accompany the conditions of membership, and especially the type of “soft”
18

conditions that are involved in proposals such as Gilbert’s idea of joint commitment.
A lot can be unclear here: the nature and extent of the joint commitments around
which a group is organized, the actions that constitute their acceptance, what people
already count as its members, and so on. These are all matters of interpretation and,
as such, are often surrounded by ambiguities, uncertainties, and indeterminacies.
That is, while it might be common knowledge that certain behaviors are obligating,
the details about the behaviors, the obligations, and the group might all be less than
fully clear.
So even if people in such situations do become obligated in some particular
way, it is not true that others can be justified in holding them to be bound, unless
there is some reassurance that they were committing themselves in just that way.
This is especially true if the obligations in question are onerous and far-reaching in
nature. As a general rule, the more comprehensive or impactful the implications of
group membership, the more demanding we should be of the conditions for
membership. For groups the impact of which is relatively minor, such as the colorcoordinating neighbors, “soft” actions, such as moving into the neighborhood, might
suffice. But for groups the impact of with is far-reaching, clearer and “harder”
conditions are plainly required.
To see this, consider a slightly different example. Suppose Donna comes
across a march of people who are campaigning for more organ donations. They hold
signs saying things like “On our way to donate kidneys! Will you?” And “Come
donate kidneys with us!” Suppose that Donna cares about organ donation, sees the
march in progress, and decides to walk along. When the march arrives at a hospital,
its participants start preparations to have their kidneys removed for donation. Can
the hospital’s physician take the fact that Donna was part of the march to be
sufficient for removing her kidney? Clearly, the answer is no. Given what is at stake,
the mere decision to join in the march, even though it satisfies Gilbert’s conditions of
joint commitment, cannot be enough. For others to take Donna to be obligated to
donate her kidney, more than just this is required. Donna would have to do
something like sign a consent form.
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If this is correct, then the prospects for the thesis that citizenship is sufficient
for taking membership in the state as a self-determining group are also dim. States
are among the most comprehensive and impactful groups. They are coercive
institutions that require and enforce the obedience of their subjects. They use their
powers to legislate on a wide variety of social, economic, cultural, and personal
matters. And the possibility of self-determination occurring at the state level further
increases their impactfulness by attaching a binding emergent moral code to
membership. Given that the argument we are inspecting here concerns how to treat
people globally, any demand that we water down the rights and freedoms of
individuals in the international realm in the name of self-determination again needs
some “harder” forms of assurance. We should expect, then, that for present
purposes the conditions of membership in the state qua self-determining group be
more like agreeing to a kidney transplant than like moving into a neighborhood.
Note that this is not to reassert the consent theory of political obligation or
state legitimacy. According to that theory, people are subject to the state’s authority
if and only if they voluntarily give their consent.28 But we have not been focusing on
state authority as such. Instead, our question has been whether membership in a
group can imply that one is bound to follow the group’s emergent norms. And when
this kind of membership becomes as pervasive as being subject to state authority,
consent, or something close to it, seems required. This leaves open the possibility
that state authority is immune to this argument about group membership. Perhaps
state authority is special in ways that group membership is not. And it leaves open
the possibility that membership in less impactful and comprehensive states can
result from the satisfaction of softer conditions.
Either way, then, the upshot is that for all practical purposes we cannot
accept that being identified as a citizen or subject by the governments that rule us is
sufficient for membership in a self-determining state. Absent the requisite
undertakings, engagements, or indications on the part of all individual persons who
live there, the mere fact of such identification by the state is as brute and morally
The classic discussion remains A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations,
(Princeton, 1979)
28
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impotent a fact as living close to the Mason-Dixon Line. Genuine state selfdetermination thus is a mirage.
This seems the correct result. If being considered a citizen were sufficient for
membership in a self-determining group, then some seriously counter-intuitive
implications would follow. It would render incoherent, for example, claims made by
secessionist movements on the grounds of self-determination. These, we would be
forced to say, are simply mistaken because, by their current state’s identification as
citizens, the people seeking secession already qualify as full members of a genuinely
self-determining group. It would therefore not even be possible for their right to
self-determination to be denied. Calls for secession would thus be obviously
mistaken in the face of state self-determination. This is implausible.
The account proposed here of course also implies that secessionist groups
cannot establish self-determining states, but the reasoning is importantly different.
For the account does allow groups as such to be self-determining. It only rules out
that the state they want to establish – which will identify members and nonmembers of the group as citizens on grounds of residence or birth and coercively
govern them – will be. But this is a general result. And so the implausible implication
is avoided. Secessionist states lack a right to self-determination for the same reason
as larger states do.29
Note that argument above cannot be challenged by claiming that
membership in a self-determining group requires only the acceptance, consent, or
agreement of that group’s majority. For in order to identify he majority of a group
we first need to know who counts as its members. We cannot say that 51 people’s
votes constitutes a majority without knowing that the group has no more than 100
members, and who those members are. But that is precisely the question we are

States can approximate self-determination to greater or lesser extents. Many of the things normally
associated with the idea of self-determination move a state closer to this ideal, including secession.
By seceding, a group would a state the citizenship of which is closer to membership in the selfdetermining group. Similarly, democratic politics and deliberation might move states closer to true
self-determination. These are aggregation procedures that translate individual beliefs and
preferences into group codes. State sovereignty protects a society against the kind of outside
interference that would override a group’s ability to arrive at its own emergent norms (i.e. norms
that are the product of the beliefs of its members).
29
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addressing here. We are asking about the boundaries of group membership, who
does, and who does not, count as a member in the first place. Important though
majority rule might be, this is one problem it cannot solve.
5. Conclusion
The argument with which we started this essay thus turns out to be unsound. Selfdetermination can give rise to moral variation, but political states are not the sites of
the requisite processes. Insofar as the demands of global justice go, then, defenders
of modest or minimalist international moral standards should look elsewhere for
support.
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